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Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department: Pushing Plaintiffs
Down the ADEA Path in Age Discrimination Suits
At last count, there were 32.6 million Americans over the age of forty-five
in the work force.1 As the Baby Boomers gray, this number will swell to 45.8
million by the year 2000.2 In the face of this burgeoning older work force, a
small dilemma has snowballed into a national issue: age discrimination on the
job. Congress has attacked this problem on behalf of older Americans through
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 3 a statutory scheme for
fighting age discrimination through judicial enforcement and conciliation. In
the last few years, though, courts have struggled in deciding whether the ADEA
is now the exclusive remedy for age-based discrimination or whether an older
employee can seek relief through alternative civil rights remedies.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted this
issue in Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department4 and concluded that the
ADEA provides the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims. The court's
holding precludes plaintiffs in the Fourth Circuit from bringing age discrimina-
tion suits outside the ADEA's procedural framework, whether the plaintiff
claims a violation of the ADEA or of some other statutory or constitutional
provision.5 The court went beyond this holding by stating that even if the
ADEA were not the exclusive remedy, workers alleging this kind of age discrim-
ination have no constitutional cause of action under the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause.6
This Note traces the principles that courts use in determining whether com-
prehensive federal statutes such as the ADEA preempt other existing remedies.
It illustrates why the Zombro court's ruling that the ADEA is the exclusive
remedy for any age discrimination claim is too broad. The Note also argues that
the court's alternative holding discounting an equal protection right for the aged
will lead to future misinterpretations. The Note concludes- that the Zombro
court circumvented Congress' intent by eliminating an important alternative
remedy to the ADEA.
In March 1986, James Zombro, a forty-five-year-old police officer with the
Baltimore City Police Department, was transferred from the Inner Harbor Tac-
tical Division to the Northeastern District.7 Although the jobs paid the same
salary, Zombro said the transfer moved him to a "job of lesser status," injured
his career development and reputation, and caused him to lose seniority in the
1. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
366 (108th ed. 1988).
2. Id.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
4. 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 147 (1989).
5. Id. at 1369.
6. Id. at 1370.
7. Id. at 1365. Zombro had served with the Baltimore Police for nineteen years when he was
transferred. He had served in the Inner Harbor District for more than two years. Joint Appendix to
Appellate Briefs at App. 51, Zombro (No. 86-2659).
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Inner Harbor District.8 According to Zombro, his supervisor told certain of-
ficers that they had been in the Inner Harbor too long and might be transferred
because of their age.9 Zombro claimed that the department was seeking to "pro-
ject a younger image" in the city's major tourist area.10 Zombro's supervisor,
however, stated that he transferred Zombro not because of his age but because of
his poor attitude and "harsh demeanor" with Inner Harbor visitors and
merchants. I
When Zombro finally decided to bring suit, more than six months had
passed since his transfer. 12 Because he had not filed notice with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within that time, the ADEA's time
limits foreclosed suing under the ADEA. 13 Instead, Zombro brought suit
against the police commissioner and the police department under section 1983,14
a remedy provided by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1871.15 Zombro
claimed that his transfer violated his right to equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment.1 6
At trial the police department moved for summary judgment. The court
8. Joint Appendix at App. 3. Zombro also claimed that the department placed adverse mate-
rial in his employment file after he questioned his transfer. The department denied this allegation.
Id. at App. 17. Zombro sought reassignment, compensatory and punitive damages, and costs. Id. at
App. 5.
9. Zombro was transferred along with two other older officers who had served 15 or more
years on the force. Id. at App. 51.
10. Appellant's Brief at 3, Zombro (No. 86-2659).
11. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1365. Zombro, however, had received several commendations from
the department and from the public for good performance prior to his transfer. Appellant's Brief at
3.
12. Telephone interview with Michael Marshall, attorney for James Zombro, Schlachman, Bel-
sky & Weiner, Baltimore, Md. (September 18, 1989). Marshall noted that Zombro delayed ob-
taining counsel because initially he "didn't want to make waves and had decided just to take his
lumps." Id.
13. The ADEA requires that within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice, the worker file a
charge outlining the unlawful practice with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982). The EEOC then notifies the employer and seeks "to eliminate
any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion." Id.
If the parties have not compromised after 60 days, the employee can file a civil suit under the
ADEA. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Congress passed § 1983 to give force to the equal protection
provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Section 1983 provides injunctive relief and damages for
state action violating constitutional or federal statutory rights. It states: "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia ... subjects... any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured."
Id.
15. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)). Zombro also brought a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1861. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982).
He based his § 1985 claim on an alleged conspiracy between the police commissioner and the de-
partment to discriminate against him because of his age. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366.
16. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1365-66. Section one of the fourteenth amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Zombro did not base his complaint on the ADEA or on Maryland's antidiscrimination statutes.
Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366; see MD. ANN. CODE Art. 49B, § 14 (1986).
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granted the department's motion. The court held that Zombro had no property
interest in a specific post in the department and that Zombro's constitutional
claim failed because his complaint did not state a liberty or property interest as
the fourteenth amendment requires. 17 The district court, however, acknowl-
edged that Zombro "does not seek to enforce rights created by the ADEA in this
action. Rather he contends that his constitutional right[s] to due process and
equal protection were violated."' 8
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment, but offered different rea-
sons. 19 Writing for the majority, Judge Chapman stated that Zombro could not
bring a fourteenth amendment claim under section 1983 because the ADEA
provides the exclusive remedy for age discrimination. 20 First, the court rea-
soned that the ADEA is a comprehensive statutory scheme that "could be un-
dermined, if not destroyed" if a plaintiff could bypass the ADEA's conciliation
procedures and bring an age discrimination claim directly in federal court.2 1
The court concluded that Congress did not intend to allow age discrimination
claims under statutes other than the ADEA.22 Second, the court cited the gov-
ernment employer-employee relationship as "a special factor that counsels hesi-
tation in recognizing a constitutional cause of action."'2 3 Government
employers, especially police departments, can exercise more control over their
personnel, the court said.24 The court went beyond holding that the ADEA is
exclusive and commented on the fourteenth amendment claim underlying Zom-
bro's section 1983 claim. The court cited the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,25 which held that the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause does not recognize the aged as a
suspect class in need of special protection.2 6 Because Zombro was not a member
of a suspect class, the court concluded that he had no equal protection rights,
17. Memorandum Opinion, reprinted in Joint Appendix at App. 5. The lower court based this
decision on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 16. Zombro, how-
ever, did not assert a due process claim, only an equal protection claim.
18. Memorandum Opinion at App. 55.
19. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1365.
20. Id. at 1369. The court also rejected the § 1985 claim because that section requires a con-
spiracy "of two or more persons." Id. at 1371. Because a department is not a person, the police
commissioner could not enter into a conspiracy with the department, and the department could not
conspire with itself. Id.
21. Id. at 1367.
22. Id. at 1369. The court focused on other comprehensive statutes that the United States
Supreme Court has deemed exclusive, stating that Congress intended "precisely drawn, detailed
statutes" to be exclusive remedies. Id.
23. Id. at 1370.
24. Id. The court noted that the "well-established public policy" that government employers
must have "wide discretion and control over the management of their personnel and internal opera-
tions." Id. at 1369. In addition, the court said that police departments are paramilitary organiza-
tions, and therefore need very broad discretion to assign and reassign members. Id. at 1369-70.
25. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam). Murgia upheld a mandatory retirement statute for Mas-
sachusetts state police officers. Id. at 314. The court held that an equal protection claim based on
age discrimination need only meet a relaxed rational-basis standard. Id.; see infra notes 111-17 and
accompanying text.
26. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1370.
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even if the ADEA did not foreclose a constitutional claim brought under section
1983.27
Judge Murnaghan vehemently dissented from the dismissal of Zombro's
section 1983 claim.28 He reasoned that Congress, not the courts, should decide
whether a statute is exclusive. Judge Murnaghan's dissent argued that "neither
the statutory language itself nor the extensive body of legislative history" indi-
cated that Congress intended to eliminate remedies for age discrimination that
"existed prior to the enactment of the ADEA."'29 He also took exception to the
majority's alternative holding and stated that the aged continue to have equal
protection rights, although they are classified under a lesser standard than
"suspect.",30
Section 198331 provides a remedy for violations precipitated by state action,
such as a violation of equal protection rights from arbitrary age discrimination
by apublic employer. 32 Section 1983 provides no substantive rights.33 "[O]ne
cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of section 1983'-for section 1983 by
itself does not protect anyone against anything."'34 Section 1983, however, does
provide a broad remedy for violations of all "rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States]."'35 The Supreme
27. Id. at 1370-71. According to the court, Zombro's equal protection claim would have to be
based on "impermissible race or sex discrimination or First Amendment violations." Id.
28. Id. at 1372 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Murnaghan con-
curred in the majority's dismissal of the § 1985 claim. Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
29. Id. at 1374 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The dissent drew a
distinction between two kinds of§ 1983 claims: those based on the ADEA itself and those on consti-
tutional rights. Judge Murnaghan argued that the latter existed prior to and independent of the
ADEA, so that the ADEA did not eliminate it. Id. at 1372-73 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
30. Id. at 1377 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The dissent character-
ized the majority's equal protection analysis as "dictum." Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 is a remedy provided by the Civil Rights Act of
1871. See supra note 14 (quoting the relevant text of the Act).
32. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 310 n.2, 312 (1976) (per
curiam). Cities and local governments are considered "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Mo-
nell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 669 (1978). To state a § 1983 claim against a
city or state, a plaintiff must show that the constitutional violation resulted from "a governmental
custom" or from a policy statement or regulation of the government's officers. Id. at 694. A single
decision by a policy maker can be sufficient to establish a custom or policy for purposes of § 1983.
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).
33. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
34. Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617 (explaining that § 1983 was in-
tended to extend the substantive provisions of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 "to all individuals
as against State action"). A plaintiff must therefore bring a § 1983 claim in conjunction with some
other statute or constitutional provision that provides substantive rights. Unlike the ADEA's rem-
edy provisions, under § 1983, a plaintiff can recover compensatory damages, Carey v. Piphuus, 435
U.S. 247, 255 (1978), and in an appropriate case, punitive damages, Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35
(1983). Municipalities, however, are immune from punitive damages. City of Newport v. Fact Con-
certs, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). This immunity can be waived, though, by state or federal law.
P. BRANDIN & D. CORPUS, IN DEFENSE OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYER 58 (1988) (citing Kolar v.




Court has held that section 1983's reference to "Constitution and laws" 36 means
that section 1983 provides remedies for violations of rights created by federal
statute, as well those created by the Constitution. 37 Section 1983 is not avail-
able, however, to remedy violations of statutory rights "where the 'governing
statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms.' "38 Therefore,
section 1983 would not provide an additional remedy for a plaintiff suing under
the ADEA if the ADEA provides the exclusive remedy for a violation of its
terms.
The background of the ADEA is helpful in examining the question of its
exclusivity. Congress enacted the ADEA to prohibit age discrimination on the
job39 through conciliation of disputes and judicial enforcement.4° Unlike sec-
tion 1983, the ADEA provides a remedy for age discrimination in all sectors of
employment, both public and private.4 1 The ADEA is "something of a hy-
brid"42 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196443 and the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA).44 The ADEA's substantive provisions are based directly on
Title VII.45 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the ADEA and Title
VII have two important similarities: "in their aims-the elimination of discrimi-
nation from the workplace-and in their substantive prohibitions. In fact, the
prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII. '' 46 The
ADEA's substantive provisions prohibit employers from refusing to hire, firing,
segregating, reducing wages, or retaliating against workers over age forty47 be-
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). For the full text of § 1983 see supra note 14.
37. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 (1980).
38. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981) (quoting Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22 n.11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
39. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The ADEA's goal is to
"promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." Id.
40. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b)-(d) (1982) (ADEA enforcement provisions).
41. Id. § 630(b) (1982). To fall within the coverage of the ADEA, however, employers must be
engaged in an industry affecting commerce and must have employed 20 or more employees for at
least 20 weeks during the current or preceding calendar year. Id.
42. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The similarities between the ADEA and
these other two statutes are significant because the Zombro court looked to the FLSA to help deter-
mine the ADEA's exclusivity. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369. Other courts, however, have relied on
Title VII to interpret whether Congress intended the ADEA to be exclusive. See, e.g., Purtill v.
Harris, 658 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1981) (ADEA prevents Bivens claims by federal employees), cert.
denied sub nom. Purtill v. Heckler, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983); Christie v. Marston, 451 F. Supp. 1142,
1146-47 & n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (same); see infra note 67.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2. In 1972 Congress extended Title VII to cover
state and local governments in addition to private employers. Id. § 2000e. At the same time, Con-
gress set up a special scheme applicable to the federal government. Id. § 2000e-16.
46. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 584. In deciding that a jury trial is available in ADEA suits,
the Lorillard court also noted "significant differences" between Title VII's and the ADEA's remedial
and procedural provisions. Id. After the Lorillard decision, Congress amended the ADEA to pro-
vide expressly for the right to a jury trial. Pub. L. 95-256, § 4, 92 Stat. 190 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(c)(2) (1982)).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). As originally enacted, the ADEA covered
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cause of their age.48 These restrictions apply to any employment agency, labor
organization or employer with twenty or more employees, 49 including state and
local governments such as the City of Baltimore.50 The remedial and proce-
dural provisions of the ADEA, however, are derived from the FLSA. 51 The
ADEA incorporates by reference several remedies provided in the FLSA.5 2
However, the ADEA goes beyond the FLSA and permits the courts "to grant
such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of
this Act."' 53 Despite the ADEA's language, courts have interpreted the ADEA
not to authorize punitive or compensatory damages.54
The Zombro decision followed a line of Supreme Court cases addressing the
exclusivity of statutes other than the ADEA and outlining general principles for
determining exclusivity.5 5 Several of the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court contradict each other.56 One general policy, however, underlies these
employees from 40 to 65 years old. Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 607 (repealed 1978). The
maximum age was raised in 1978 to cover 40 to 70 year olds. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4, 81 Stat. 607
(repealed 1986). In 1986 Congress removed the upper age limitation entirely, Pub. L. No. 99-592,
§ 2, 100 Stat. 3342-43 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1987)), except for bonn fide
mandatory retirement laws for firefighters and law enforcement officers, id. §§ 3-4, 100 Stat. 3342-43
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(i) (Supp. V 1987)), and tenure for college professors over age 70. Id.
§ 6, 100 Stat. 3344 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(d) (Supp. V 1987)).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), (d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623 with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1982).
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 630(b)-(d) (1982).
50. When Congress passed the ADEA in 1967, the Act did not apply to federal, state, or local
governments. In the 1974 amendments, Congress extended the ADEA to any employer who is "a
State or political subdivision of a State, and any agency or instrumentality of a State or political
subdivision of a State." Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 74 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982)).
The 1974 amendments also extended ADEA protection to federal employees through a separate
section establishing procedures for age discrimination suits against federal government employers,
Id. § 15, 88 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1982)). This federal scheme autho-
rizes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce the provisions through "appropri-
ate remedies," 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b) (1982), and permits the worker to bring suit for legal and
equitable relief 30 days after filing a notice of intent to sue. Id. § 633a(d).
51. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978). For example, unlike Title VII, the ADEA
specifically provides for a right to jury trial. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1982).
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The ADEA incorporates these provisions by
stating that the "provisions of this Act shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies,
and procedures provided in sections 211 (b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this
title." Id. § 626(b). Section 211(b) permits state and local agencies to assist the EEOC and to re-
ceive reimbursement for their services. Id. § 211(b). Section 216 provides remedies for the recovery
of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation, as well as an additional equal amount
for liquidated damages. Id. §§ 216(b)-(c). The ADEA modifies this provision by providing liqui-
dated damages only if an employer willfully violates the ADEA. Id. § 626(b). Section 217 permits
injunctions to restrain employers from withholding an employee's unpaid wages. Id. § 217 (1982).
53. Id. § 626(b). Appropriate relief includes compelled employment, reinstatement or promo-
tion, or liability for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation. Id. § 626(b). Some
courts permit future damages (called "front pay") under the ADEA. See, Marion, Legal and Equi.
table Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 45 MD. L. REV. 298, 331-38
(1986) (discussing the availability of front pay under the ADEA).
54. See, eg., Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 687-88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1039 (1982); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 110 (Ist Cir. 1978); Dean v.
American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-40 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
55. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
22 (1981); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974).
56. Compare Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974) (holding that repeals by implication
are disfavored) with Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973) (stating that precisely drawn,
detailed statutes preempt more general remedies).
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conflicting decisions: The key to determining exclusivity is uncovering congres-
sional intent because Congress alone retains the authority to repeal or replace an
act with an alternative remedy. 57 The Supreme Court has reiterated a "cardinal
rule" of statutory interpretation that disfavors repeal of a statute by implica-
tion.58 The Court has required "some affirmative showing of an intention to
repeal" by Congress unless "the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable." 59
According to the Court, "The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among
congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it
is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective."' 60 Congressional intent favoring repeal
may appear in either a statute's language or in its legislative history.61
If the language and legislative history are not helpful, the Supreme Court
has indicated that precisely drawn, detailed statutes may reflect Congress' intent
to preempt more general remedies. 62 This general principle is somewhat incon-
sistent with the rule against repeals without express congressional intent. The
Court, inferring exclusivity from precise statutes, reasoned that plaintiffs should
not be allowed to avoid a detailed statute's restrictions by "putting a different
label on their pleadings." 63 Similarly, the Supreme Court has stated that a
"comprehensive enforcement scheme" may indicate congressional intent to
make a statute exclusive. 64 The dissenting opinion in Zombro argued that the
57. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011 (1984), superseded by statute on other grounds,
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (Supp. V 1987). The Robinson Court held that the Education of the Handi-
capped Act's language and legislative history indicated that Congress intended the Act to be the
exclusive avenue for asserting an equal protection claim to a publicly-financed special education. Id.
at 1010. The Robinson Court stated that allowing an equal protection claim under § 1983 would
"render superfluous most of the detailed procedural protections outlined in the statute." Id. at 1009.
Congress did not agree. In 1986, Congress amended the Education of Handicapped Act to provide
other constitutional and statutory remedies to the handicapped for plaintiffs who have first ex-
hausted the Act's procedures. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (Supp. V 1987).
58. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 549. The Mancari Court refused to allow Title VII to repeal the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 without clear congressional intent. Id. at 547.
59. Id. at 550.
60. Id. at 551. The concurring opinion in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring), agreed that "the question is not
whether Congress 'intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action' but rather whether Congress
intended to withdraw that right of action." Id. at 27 (Stevens, J., concurring). The concurring jus-
tices would have placed the burden on the defendant to show that the comprehensive remedy re-
places the more general statutes. "No matter how comprehensive we may consider a statute's
remedial scheme to be, Congress is at liberty to leave other remedial avenues open." Id. at 28
(Stevens, J., concurring).
61. See, eg., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (inferring from
legislative history that Title VII does not preempt § 1981 claims).
62. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). The Court in Preiser held that the federal
habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), provide the exclusive
remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of their confinement. The Preiser Court stated that
"even though the literal terms of section 1983 might seem to cover such a challenge," Congress
preempted § 1983 with the more specific statute. Id. at 489. The court also found explicit congres-
sional intent to make habeas corpus statutes exclusive because Congress' 1948 amendments required
exhaustion of adequate state remedies before plaintiffs could bring federal suits. Id. at 489-90. The
Court added that a § 1983 claim would be available if the prisoner sought "something other than
immediate or more speedy release-the traditional purpose of habeas corpus." Id. at 494.
63. Id. at 489-90.
64. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
The Court in National Sea Clammers held that two environmental statutes, the Federal Water Pollu-
1990] 1001
NOR TH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
principles of comprehensiveness apply only to section 1983 claims based on the
rights ADEA created and not on other prior and independent rights. The dis-
sent reasoned that examining comprehensiveness is appropriate only for statutes
specifically designed by Congress to provide methods for enforcing violations of
constitutional rights, something the ADEA does not do.65
The Zombro court, as have other courts, used these general principles to
interpret the ADEA while also looking to Title VII and the FLSA to ferret out
congressional intent.66 Courts have relied most often on Title VII to interpret
the ADEA's exclusivity, because legislative history indicates the two were in-
tended to be interpreted similarly. 67 In the House Report accompanying the
legislation that extended Title VII coverage to state and local employees, Con-
gress stated explicitly that it intended to leave existing remedies, including sec-
tion 1983, untouched. 68
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether Title VII forecloses sec-
tion 1983 causes of action, but has discussed its effect on two related civil rights
tion Control Act (FWPCA) and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(MPRSA), preempted fishermen's § 1983 claims. Id. at 21. The Court held that Congress would
not have passed these environmental acts that have their "own comprehensive enforcement
scheme[s]" if plaintiffs could bypass the schemes with § 1983 suits. Id. at 19-20 (quoting Chapman
v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 673 n.2 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). "When the
remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to
demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983." Id. The Court,
however, preempted a § 1983 claim based on a judicially created Bivens claim, not a statutory § 1983
claim. See infra note 132 (discussing Bivens claims).
65. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1372-73 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1367-69.
67. The courts have focused on the legislative history of the 1972 amendments extending Title
VII to government employers, the same extension the ADEA underwent two years later. Senator
Lloyd Bentsen, a sponsor of the amendments to the ADEA, noted during the Title VII hearings: "I
believe that the principles underlying these provisions in the EEOC bill (extending Title VII to
public employers) are directly applicable to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act." 118
CONG. Rac. 15,895 (1972). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated:
"We find the history of Title VII particularly helpful because it is the legislation which most closely
parallels the ADEA." EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 1982); accord Kelly v.
Wauconda, 801 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Congress intended the ADEA amendment to paral-
lel the Title VII amendment .. "), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987); Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State
Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 244 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (citing similarities between Title VII and the
ADEA). But see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (Title VII and the ADEA have "signifi-
cant differences" in their remedial and procedural provisions); Ring v. Crisp County Hosp. Auth.,
652 F. Supp. 477,481 (M.D. Ga. 1987) ("Although the prohibitions of the ADEA should perhaps be
construed similarly to the prohibitions in Title VII, this court is not convinced that the ADEA
should be construed in pari materia with Title VII.")
68. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG, & ADMIN.
NEWS 2137, 2154. The House report noted:
In establishing the applicability of Title VII to State and local employees, the Committee
wishes to emphasize that the individual's right to file a civil action in his own behalf, pursu-
ant to the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983, is in no way
affected .... Title VII was envisioned as an independent statutory authority meant to
provide an aggrieved individual with an additional remedy to redress employment discrim-
ination.... Inclusion of state and local employees among those enjoying the protection of
Title VII provides an alternate administrative remedy to the existing prohibition against
discrimination perpetuated "under color of state law."
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statutes, section 198169 and section 1985.70 The Court has held that a private
employee can bring a section 1981 claim despite Title VII's comprehensive
structure and is "not limited to Title VII in his search for relief."' 71 The Court
reasoned that it would not "infer any positive preference for one over the other"
without a clear congressional repeal. 72 Most recently, however, the Court lim-
ited its view of section 1981 rights in an attempt to force plaintiffs to use the
Title VII scheme. 73 The Court, however, indicated it still would enforce a legiti-
mate section 1981 right, despite Title VII's existence. The Court said that
"[w]here conduct is covered by both section 1981 and Title VII,. . . [a] plaintiff
is free to pursue a claim by bringing suit under section 1981 without resort to
those statutory prerequisites."' 74 In contrast, the Supreme Court has found that
Congress intended Title VII to be "an exclusive pre-emptive administrative and
judicial scheme" in federal employment.75 The Court based this finding on the
fact that Title VII's legislative history indicated that Congress believed that fed-
eral employees had no existing judicial remedy prior to Title VII.76
In a later case, the Court implied that Title VII was the exclusive remedy
for all claims arising exclusively under that statute, but not the only remedy for
separate constitutional violations brought under section 1985. 77 The Court
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Section 1981, created by the Civil Rights Act of 1870, provides a
remedy for the denial of equal rights to contract regardless of race and equal benefits of the laws. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982). Section 1985, created by the Civil Rights Act of 1861, prohibits
conspiracies interfering with civil rights. Id.
71. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
72. Id. at 461.
73. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2371 (1989). The Court held that
plaintiff in Patterson had to use Title VII because § 1981 applied only to the right to make and
enforce contracts and not to all contract-related rights. Id. at 2369-70. The Court sought to elimi-
nate unnecessary overlap between Title VII and § 1981. Id. at 2375. The Court was reluctant to
"read an earlier statute broadly where the result is to circumvent the detailed remedial scheme
constructed in a later statute." Id. For a discussion of Patterson, see Note, Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union: New Limitations on an Old Civil Rights Statute, 68 N.C.L. REv. 799 (1990).
74. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2375.
75. Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828-29 (1976).
76. The Court cited Senator Alan Cranston, co-author of the amendment, who stated that the
amendments "[flor the first time, permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government in dis-
crimination cases." Id. at 828 (citing 118 CONG. Rnc. 4929 (1972)). The "balance, completeness,
and structural integrity" of the federal employees' section of Title VII also persuaded the Court that
Congress intended Title VII to be the exclusive remedy for federal employees. Id. at 832. Congress
may have believed sovereign immunity barred claims against the federal government. Shapiro, Sec-
tion 1983 Claims to Redress Discrimination in Public Employment: Are They Preempted by Title
VII?, 35 AM. U.L. REv. 93, 110 (1985).
77. Great Am. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1979). Novotny,
an employee at a federal savings and loan institution, claimed damages under § 1985(3), alleging that
he had been injured as a result of a violation of Title VII and a conspiracy to deprive him of equal
protection. Id. The Supreme Court rejected his § 1985(3) claim noting that, like § 1983, § 1985(3)
provides no substantive rights but only a remedy for violations of other statutory or constitutional
provisions. Id. at 372.
The Novotny Court expressly prohibited only § 1985(3) claims alleging deprivation of rights
created under Title VII. Id. at 377. According to the Court, "[u]nimpaired effectiveness can be
given to the plan put together by Congress in Title VII only by holding that deprivation of a right
created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under § 1985(3)." Id. at 378. Follow-
ing the Court's reasoning, a plaintiff asserting a right created exclusively under Title VII will be
limited to the remedial provisions in Title VII. If, however, the right can be asserted under an
independent constitutional or statutory provision, such as the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment, concurrent Title VII and § 1985(3) remedies may exist. See id. at 376-78.
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noted that because private employees had no constitutional remedy for employ-
ment discrimination before the passage of Title VII,78 "deprivation of a right
created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under section
1985(3). " 7 9
Several federal appeals courts,80 including the Fourth Circuit,81 and many
district courtss 2 have permitted section 1983 claims based on rights independent
of Title VII. Courts reason that a plaintiff could not use section 1983 to bring a
Title VII suit because Congress intended "to make the comprehensive provisions
of that statute the exclusive remedy for violations of its terms."'83 However,
Congress intended to retain section 1983 suits based on other rights not created
by that particular statute.84 "Title VII was envisioned as an independent statu-
tory authority meant to provide an aggrieved individual with an additional rem-
edy to redress employment discrimination."8
The Zombro court did not look to Title VII to interpret the ADEA's exclu-
sivity, but instead relied on the Fair Labor Standards Act, 86 part of which is
incorporated into the ADEA's remedies section.87 Courts have seldom used the
78. Although freedom from discrimination is a right protected by the fourteenth amendment,
two concurring justices explained that the plaintiffin Novotny had no equal protection claim prior to
Title VII because he was a victim of private sector discrimination and thus, no state action gave rise
to a constitutional claim. Id. at 380 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 384-85 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
80. See, ag., Garza v. City of Omaha, 814 F.2d 553, 555-57 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding action
based on both § 1983 and Title VII); Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 766 F.2d 299, 301
(7th Cir. 1985) (Title VII's legislative history "clearly indicates that § 2 was not intended to displace
the existing § 1983 remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations for state employees.").
81. In Keller v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1987), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that § 1983 remained a remedy for racial discrimination,
despite Title VII. "Indeed, Congress recognized in adopting Title VII that no single approach to the
problem of employment discrimination could be a panacea." Id. at 957.
82. See, e.g., Pollard v. City of Chicago, 643 F. Supp. 1244, 1251-52 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (conclud-
ing that Congress did not intend to displace § 1983 with Title VII); Meyett v. Coleman, 613 F. Supp.
39, 40 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (stating that Congress intended Title VII to be the exclusive remedy for
violations of its terms, without affecting pre-existing § 1983 rights); Storey v. Board of Regents, 600
F. Supp. 838, 840 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (holding that Title VII is not the exclusive remedy for sex
discrimination not based on Title VII); Zewde v. Elgin Community College, 601 F. Supp. 1237,
1244-48 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (allowing plaintiff to state a constitutional claim under § 1983 stemming
from the same operative facts as a Title VII claim); see also Shapiro, supra note 76, at 116-21 (argu-
ing that Title VII should not preempt existing remedies); Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered The
Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824, 849 (1972) (Title VII is an alternative
remedy for state employees to § 1983 actions implicating the fourteenth amendment.). But see
Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 592 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (Title VII
deemed exclusive remedy for race discrimination claim.).
83. Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1204 (6th Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 1205. The Day court explained that:
[w]here an employee establishes employer conduct which violates both Title VII and rights
derived from another source-the Constitution or a federal statute-which existed at the
time of the enactment of Title VII, the claim based on the other source is independent of
the Title VII claim, and the plaintiff may seek the remedies provided by § 1983.
Id.
85. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2154).
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).




FLSA to interpret the ADEA "because unlike the ADEA or Title VII, the
FLSA did not create a statutory right which arguably was already guaranteed by
the Constitution. 8 8 Although courts rarely have dealt with the exclusivity of
the FLSA, one district court indicated that the FLSA was "the sole means by
which employees could enforce the rights created by [the FLSA]." 8 9 But neither
that court nor any other has addressed whether the FLSA eliminated existing
constitutional claims.
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether the ADEA is the exclu-
sive remedy for age discrimination. Only a few lower courts have ruled on the
issue.90 Courts that have considered the issue agree that the ADEA is the exclu-
sive remedy for age discrimination involving federal employees.9 1 These deci-
sions relied on similarities between Title VII and the ADEA, and concluded that
Congress believed both Title VII and the ADEA created new rights that "had
not been previously supplied by administrative and judicial remedies" to federal
employees.92 In addition, the comprehensiveness of the ADEA provision cover-
ing federal employees indicated "Congress clearly intended that all such claims
of age discrimination be limited to the rights and procedures authorized by the
Act . . . -93 Because these cases involved Bivens actions, 94 special factors in-
volved in the federal workplace also warranted hesitation in recognizing an im-
plied claim for age discrimination. 95
Decisions discussing state, local, and private employees are less clear-cut
than the ADEA cases involving federal employees. As with Title VII, courts
agree that section 1983 claims based directly on the ADEA and not on in-
dependent, constitutional rights cannot be sustained.96 The ADEA precludes
section 1983 claims based on its own provisions because the statute provides its
88. Christie v. Marston, 451 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
89. Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
90. See Ring v. Crisp County Hosp. Auth., 652 F. Supp. 477, 479 (M.D. Ga. 1987) ("There is a
dearth of cases that address the issue.").
91. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 524-25 (5th Cir. May 1981) (holding that a
federal employee could not bring claims under the fifth amendment); Purtill v. Harris, 658 F.2d 134,
138 (3d Cir. 1981) (prohibiting federal Health & Human Services employee from bringing a Bivens
age discrimination claim), cert denied sub nor. Purtill v. Heckler, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983); Christie v.
Marston, 451 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (precluding a federal bank employee from bring-
ing a Bivens claim for age discrimination).
92. Christie, 451 F. Supp. at 1146 (citation omitted); see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying
text.
93. Paterson, 644 F.2d at 525.
94. A Bivens claim is a judicially created cause of action for damages to remedy constitutional
violations by federal actors. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396 (1971); see Note, Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of a Constitutional
Cause of Action, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1251 (1988); infra note 132.
95. Purtill, 658 F.2d at 137. The court in Purtill prohibited federal employees from bringing a
Bivens claim under the Constitution. Both the special factors involved in the federal work place and
the legislative history of the ADEA's federal employment scheme indicated congressional intent "to
preempt Bivens remedies arising out of age discrimination claims by federal employees." Id.
96. See, eg., LaBlanc v. City of Stamford, No. B-88-63 (D. Conn. May 10, 1988) (WESTLAW,
Allfeds library) (Plaintiffs "may not bring an action under §§ 1983 or 1985 to enforce the statutory
rights created by the ADEA."); Price v. Erie County, 654 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 (W.D.N.Y. 1987)
(same); Morgan v. Humboldt County School Dist., 623 F. Supp 440, 442-43 (D. Nev. 1985) (same).
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own remedy. 97 Because of the ADEA's "informal settling of disputes," other
available means of enforcement could undermine the congressional scheme. 98 If
courts permitted plaintiffs to seek other remedies for ADEA violations, the
ADEA's "express time limitations could be altered, the administrative process
bypassed, and the goal of compliance through mediation lost." 99
Courts are split, however, on whether plaintiffs can maintain section 1983
claims based on rights independent of the ADEA. On one side, several district
courts have held that the ADEA precludes section 1983 age discrimination suits
based either on the ADEA or on the Constitution.100 According to this view,
the ADEA preempts the plaintiff's constitutional claim unless it is "distinct"
from any age discrimination claim. 10 1 On the other side, several district courts
have decided that a section 1983 action is available if the age discrimination
claim is brought under some other constitutional or statutory provision, rather
than under the ADEA. 10 2 Under this view, if a plaintiff alleges facts in a com-
plaint that "defendants violated some federally secured right other than those
already protected by the ADEA, a separate § 1983 [action] could lie." 103 Other
courts, including the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit prior to Zombro,
have considered the merits of section 1983 claims based on equal protection
rights, without questioning the ADEA's exclusivity.104
97. McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1208-09 (S.D. Ga. 1982). In McCroan, a part-time
cashier at a state college was prohibited from using § 1983 to assert her ADEA claim that she was
forced into retirement. Id. at 1202. The McCroan court did not decide if Congress foreclosed claims
based on some other provisions besides the ADEA, such as a constitutional provision or a separate
statute.
98. Id. at 1209.
99. Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 242 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
100. See, eg., Martinez v. Roque, No. 61-922 (D.P.R., May 31, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds
Library) (Congress intended to replace § 1983 claims with the ADEA.); Ring v. Crisp County Hosp.
Auth., 652 F. Supp. 477, 482 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (same).
101. Ring, 652 F. Supp. at 482. The court in Ring relied on the lack of legislative history and
the comprehensiveness of the ADEA as indications that "all claims of age discrimination be limited
to the rights and procedures authorized by the ADEA." Id. The court, however, let stand the due
process and first amendment rights asserted through § 1983 because these rights were "distinct"
from the age discrimination claims. Id.
102. See, eg., Howard v. Daiichiya-Love's Bakery, 714 F. Supp. 1108, 1113 (D. Haw. 1989)
("[The ADEA] is not an exclusive remedy, in that it does not abrogate remedies which already
existed."); LaBlanc v. Stamford, No. 148431 (D. Conn., May 10, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds
Database) (permitting a plaintiff to enforce an age discrimination claim based on fourteenth amend-
ment rights); Haag v. Board of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1267, 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (allowing a local
school teacher to sue under § 1983 for age discrimination); Price v. Erie, 654 F. Supp. 1206, 1208
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding a § 1983 action "based not upon a substantive violation of the ADEA
but rather upon substantive violations of the United States Constitution"); Bleakley, 536 F. Supp. at
237 (holding state agency could be sued under the fourteenth amendment and § 1983 despite the
ADEA).
103. Morgan v. Humboldt County School Dist., 623 F. Supp. 440, 443 (D. Nev. 1985).
104. The Supreme Court in Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1978), considered a fifth amendment
equal protection claim concerning the mandatory retirement of Foreign Service officers, although the
district court had considered and rejected the officers' ADEA claim. Id. at 95. The Court ultimately
rejected the equal protection claim on the facts presented. The Fourth Circuit in Johnson v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 363 (1985), addressed
whether a Baltimore firefighter, who claimed the city's mandatory retirement at age 55 was discrimi-
natory, presented a valid claim. Id. at 211. The court considered both an ADEA and a § 1983 claim
under the fourteenth amendment. The court held that the equal protection claim failed on these
facts because the legislation was not inherently unreasonable. Id.; see also McLaurin v. Fischer, 768
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Along with this procedural exclusivity issue, the Zombro court addressed
the substantive issue of what rights, if any, the aged have under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. 10 5 Since the fourteenth amendment's
adoption in 1868, the Supreme Court has created a multi-tiered standard of re-
view for equal protection cases. 10 6 Courts review equal protection rights of
"suspect" classifications' 07
-including race, alienage, and national origin-
under a stringent "strict scrutiny" standard. s0 8 Equal protection rights of non-
suspect classes 0 9 receive less scrutiny under a more relaxed "minimum review"
or rationality standard."10
The Supreme Court in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia111
stated that the aged have rights under the equal protection clause, but that age is
not a suspect classification. 112 In Murgia a state police officer claimed that a
Massachusetts statute, requiring retirement of uniformed state police officers at
age fifty, was unconstitutional because it violated the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause. 113 According to the Court, the aged "have not exper-
ienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics." ' " 4 Because the statute
only "draws the line at a certain age in middle life," minimal review provided
sufficient protection." 5 In applying this test, the Court examined whether the
state's classification was rationally related to a legitimate governmental inter-
F.2d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging fourteenth amendment claim along with an ADEA
claim); Alford v. City of Lubbock, 684 F.2d 1263, 1266 (5th Cir. Unit A) (recognizing both an
ADEA and an equal protection claim), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d
1267, 1272 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding equal protection claim in a challenge to a mandatory retirement
statute).
105. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see supra note 16 (full text of the fourteenth
amendment).
106. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978).
107. Suspect groups are "discrete and insular minorities" that need special judicial protection.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
108. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). This standard requires courts to
scrutinize public employers' actions strictly. Disparate treatment of suspect classes can be upheld
only if the treatment furthers a "compelling state interest" and uses means narrowly tailored and
necessary to meet that interest. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972).
109. Nonsuspect classes are those "not saddled with [the] disabilities [of the suspect classes], or
subjected to... a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to... a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Examples of non-suspect groups
are the poor, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28, and the mentally retarded, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 457 U.S. 176, 181 (1982). Gender is a quasi-suspect group, so sex discrimination
receives intermediate scrutiny by courts. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of these objectives."). Illegitimacy is also a quasi-suspect classification receiving inter-
mediate, but not strict, judicial review. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1982).
110. This standard requires only that the state action "bear some rational relationship to legiti-
mate state purposes." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40.
111. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
112. Id. at 313.
113. Id. at 308-11.
114. Id. at 313 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28).
115. Id. at 313-14.
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est. 1 16 The mandatory retirement statute met the legitimate government interest
standard because it rationally furthered the purpose identified by the State: "as-
suring physical preparedness of its uniformed police."' 17
In the midst of the division among courts over the ADEA's exclusivity, the
Zombro court resolved the issue for the Fourth Circuit. The Zombro court's
analysis of the exclusivity issue involved several steps. First, the court said the
ADEA's comprehensiveness indicated that the ADEA should be the exclusive
remedy for age discrimination.11 8 The court noted that allowing a worker "di-
rect and immediate access to the federal courts" would undermine the ADEA's
goal of conciliation and its detailed filing provisions.1 19 The court stated that it
assumed that Zombro brought a section 1983 suit and not an ADEA suit to
bypass intentionally "the specific administrative process of the ADEA."'120
The court next focused on congressional intent. In the face of such a com-
prehensive statute, the court said that a section 1983 action cannot stand unless
the ADEA "manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual a choice of
pursuing independently rights under both." 121 The court cited non-age discrim-
ination cases122 in which the Supreme Court foreclosed a section 1983 or section
1985 claim because a detailed, comprehensive statute provided "'an exclusive
remedy for violations of its terms.' "123 The court conceded, however, that
Zombro's claim was "an unusual case." 124 It acknowledged that his section
1983 claim was "predicated on an alleged constitutional violation only and [did]
116. Id. at 314-16. In 1979 the Supreme Court in Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979), again
upheld a mandatory retirement provision using the minimum review standard. Vance involved the
Foreign Service Act's provisions for mandatory retirement of all personnel at age 60. Id. at 96. The
Court stated that the system was valid under the equal protection clause because it was rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest. The legitimate interest was assuring "the profes-
sional competence, as well as mental and physical reliability, of the corps" as well as the rapid
advancement of younger officers. Id. at 97-98. The district court opinion in Vance illustrated that
conceivably a statute may fail the rationality standard by holding that this law did not meet this
minimum review standard. Bradley v. Vance, 436 F. Supp. 134, 136 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 93 (1979). According to the district court, the statute was not reasonably related
to a legitimate state interest because to recruit and promote youth was "inherently discriminatory."
Id. at 94; see also Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 731 F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding
firefighters' pension plan under the minimum review test), rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 353
(1985).
117. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314. The Court reasoned that "physical ability generally declines with
age" so that retirement at 50 removes officers whose fitness may have diminished. Id. at 315. A
similar statute could be invalid if it "excluded from service so few officers who are in fact unquali-
fied" that it would be wholly unrelated to the state's objective. Id. at 316.
118. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1367. Zombro actually did not bring suit under the ADEA because he could not do
so. The 180-day notice requirement under the ADEA had lapsed before he considered bringing suit.
See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
121. Id. But see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974) (disfavoring repeals without ex-
press congressional intent). The Zombro court did not cite any specific legislative history of the
ADEA that indicated Congress did not intend to retain existing remedies. It simply stated: "We
find no such intent in the language and history of the ADEA." Id. at 1369.
122. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1367 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Brown V.
General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)).




not rest in part or in whole on alleged violations of substantive rights under the
ADEA" or some other comprehensive statute.125 This difference was not a ma-
jor stumbling block for the court, however. The court found the policy of exclu-
sivity "as applicable in instances such as the case at bar as cases where [sic] a
constitutional claim is attached to a statutory claim brought under § 1983."126
The court then cited decisions by other courts holding that "substantive rights
secured by the ADEA may not be used as a basis for a section 1983 suit."'127
The court found support for exclusivity by compaiing the ADEA to the FLSA's
enforcement mechanism.1 28 The court cited Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures,
Inc.,129 which held that the FLSA "is the sole remedy available to the employee
for enforcement of whatever rights he may have under the FLSA."
130
In addition to congressional intent, the court added a second justification
for its holding: Additional factors counseled hesitation in recognizing Officer
Zombro's section 1983 claim.131 In considering these special factors, the court
seemed to draw on the strict test for recognizing a Bivens claim, not the general
test for determining exclusivity. 132 The special factors involved in Zombro in-
cluded the wide discretion given government employers over personnel matters
and the added tolerance for decisions in "paramilitary" departments involving
public safety. 133 The decision stated that "the government has traditionally
been granted the widest latitude in the 'dispatch of its own internal affairs.' 134
The court concluded that allowing a constitutional section 1983 claim against
the police department would undermine governmental discretion and "transfer
125. Id. at 1368.
126. Id. at 1369.
127. Id (citing Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. May 1981); Ring v. Crisp County
Hosp. Auth., 652 F. Supp. 477 (M.D. Ga. 1987); and McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.
Ga. 1982)); see supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text (discussing the cases cited by the Zombro
court). The court did not note any distinguishing features of these cases, such as the federal em-
ployer-employee relationship or § 1983 suits based on rights created by the ADEA as opposed to
rights created by constitutional provisions.
128. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369. The court did not address the relation of Title VII to the
ADEA or the Supreme Court's responses to Title VII's exclusivity.
129. 343 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
130. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369.
131. Id.
132. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
See supra note 94. The status of a Bivens claim is more tenuous than a statutory remedy such as
§ 1983 because the Supreme Court recently has been reluctant to imply Bivens causes of action.
That sentiment is reflected in a more lenient test for disallowing Bivens claims. See Note, supra note
94, at 1254-56. The Bivens court stated that to disallow an implied constitutional claim, Congress
must have declared that a new statutory remedy preempts the implied constitutional remedy. Biv-
ens, 403 U.S. at 397. The Court in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), summarized the situations
in which courts should reject Bivens claims: 1) when Congress provides an alternative, "equally
effective" remedy that it "explicitly declared to be a substitute" for direct recovery under the Consti-
tution, or 2) when special factors counsel hesitation in keeping the cause of action in the absence of
such congressional intent. Id. at 18-19. The Court in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), further
restricted Bivens claims by stating that the new statutory scheme itself could be a special factor in
not recognizing Bivens claims. Id. at 378-88. The Zombro court erroneously applied the test appli-
cable to Bivens claims. This application is improper in Zombro because the case addresses an ex-
isting statutory remedy. It also cites for support cases that involve Bivens-not statutory-claims.
133. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369-70.
134. Id. at 1370 (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974)).
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wholesale public employment relations into the federal courts. '135
After this lengthy exclusivity discussion, the court offered a second argu-
ment that Zombro never had an equal protection claim. The court indicated
that even if Zombro's constitutional claim was not precluded by the ADEA, the
equal protection clause does not protect against this kind of age discrimina-
tion. 136 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court in Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia 137 did "not recognize 'a class defined as the aged'" as a
suspect classification. 138 The court also stated that the Fourth Circuit has only
permitted equal protection claims based on race, sex, or the exercise of protected
first amendment rights. 139 Without such a violation, the court was hesitant "to
intervene in the multitude of personnel and management decisions made daily in
public agencies."'140
Judge Murnaghan dissented on several grounds. He stated that the major-
ity had overstepped its bounds, substituting its judgment for that of Congress by
impliedly repealing section 1983 claims in age discrimination cases. 141 The dis-
sent reasoned that the majority "blur[red] the crucial distinctions between two
very different types of section 1983 claims,"' 142 those based on ADEA rights and
those based on independent rights. Judge Mumaghan agreed that the ADEA
precludes section 1983 suits based only on rights created by the ADEA because
its comprehensiveness indicated congressional intent to foreclose such suits.143
He added, though, that the existence of a comprehensive remedy "tells us noth-
ing about whether Congress intended to retain or to repeal the section 1983
cause of action for enforcement of rights that existed prior to and independently
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1371. The Zombro court stated in a footnote that it was not invalidating equal pro-
tection claims challenging mandatory retirement statutes, but only age-based disparate treatment
challenges to specific personnel decisions. Id. at 1370 n.4. A disparate treatment case is one in
which the employer treats the employee less favorably than others because of a certain characteristic
of the employee. Disparate treatment requires that an employer have a proven discriminatory mo-
tive in making its personnel decision. P. BRANDIN & D. CORPUS, supra note 35, at 3. In contrast,
mandatory retirement statutes cover all employees falling in that classification.
137. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
138. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1370. The court did not mention the minimum review standard used
in Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312, or the fact the Supreme Court has not held that equal protection claims
are never available to the aged. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 95 (1979) ("rational relationship"
standard applied to uphold mandatory retirement standard for foreign service employees).
139. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1371. As support, the court cited Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634 (4th
Cir. 1979), in which a professor denied tenure claimed an equal protection violation. The Zombro
court interpreted Clark as restricting judicial review to any personnel decision that was " 'tainted by
racial or sex discrimination or was intended to penalize for the exercise of First Amendment
rights.'" Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1371 (quoting Clark, 607 F.2d at 638-39). Plaintiff Clark had
claimed no discrimination, only a failure to apply the evaluation standard used in the past. Clark,
607 F.2d at 638-39. The Clark court also stated that an equal protection claim would be valid in
other cases if the rule "on its face discriminated against out-of-staters or non-graduates." Id. at 641
n.13.
140. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1371.
141. Id. at 1372 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). According to Judge
Murnaghan, "It is up to Congress not this Court, to balance the risks and benefits inherent in al-
lowing alternative remedies to co-exist in the fight against discrimination." Id. at 1376 (Murnaghan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
142. Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
143. Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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of the ADEA."' 144 Judge Murnaghan noted that the Supreme Court has a
strong policy against repeal by implication unless "'the earlier and later statutes
are irreconcilable.' "145 He stated that the legislative history of the ADEA did
not reflect congressional intent to eliminate existing remedies, but instead indi-
cated an intent to keep prior remedies intact. 14 6 The dissent also criticized the
majority's equal protection analysis and questioned its "strange view of the law"
implying that "government employees apparently could never raise equal pro-
tection challenges to age discrimination in the workplace, even if the ADEA did
not exist." 14 7 Judge Murnaghan also noted that both the Fourth Circuit and the
Supreme Court have recognized age-based equal protection claims under the
minimum review standard. 148
The Zombro court focused on two factors to determine that the ADEA is
the exclusive remedy for any age discrimination claim: 149 (1) Congress' intent
in enacting the ADEA, and (2) special factors counseling hesitation against al-
lowing other age discrimination remedies. 150 The first factor-Congress' intent
in adopting the ADEA-is clearly the critical one because the Supreme Court
has directed lower courts to determine the exclusivity of an existing claim by
examining "what Congress intended."''
The Zombro court first chose between two possible presumptions: the pre-
sumption that existing remedies remain intact absent explicit congressional in-
tent to repeal them and the presumption that existing remedies are repealed
unless Congress states otherwise. The Zombro court chose the latter, stating
that Congress must intend to "allow an individual a choice of pursuing indepen-
144. Id. at 1372-73 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
145. Id. at 1373 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)). Judge Murnaghan stated that the statutes at issue are not
irreconcilable but instead are complementary ways of fighting age discrimination. Therefore, the
court must presume Congress intended to allow both claims unless the legislation specifically indi-
cated otherwise. Id. at 1373-74 (citing HousE SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING, MANDATORY RE-
TIREMENT: THE SOCIAL AND HUMAN COST OF ENFORCED IDLENESS, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 15-17,
38 (1981)).
146. Id. at 1374 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In addition, the dissent
noted that the "additional factors" the majority cited were not controlling because police officers and
foreign service officers in Murgia and Vance were permitted to bring equal protection claims despite
the governmental and paramilitary nature of their work. Id. at 1378 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
147. Id. at 1377 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
148. Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (per curiam) and Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore,
731 F.2d 209, 210-211 (4th Cir. 1984) (Murnaghan, J., writing for the majority), rev'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 353 (1985)); see also Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1272 (4th Cir. 1977) (Fourth
Circuit recognizes constitutional age discrimination claim).
149. This Note, in analyzing the Zombro court's exclusivity discussion, will make the same as-
sumption the court initially made: Officer Zombro and the aged had an existing equal protection
right before Congress created the ADEA. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366-70. In its second argument,
the Zombro court refuted this assumption by saying that even if the ADEA were not exclusive,
Zombro and older Americans never had equal protection rights in the first place. Id. at 1371.
150. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369. These are the same factors the Supreme Court used in Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), to determine if a Bivens implied constitutional right can be brought in
lieu of an existing statutory remedy. Id. at 18-19.
151. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984), superseded by statute on other grounds, 20
U.S.C. § 1415(f) (Supp. V 1987).
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dently rights" under both remedies for existing remedies to remain.15 2 Under
this standard, congressional silence on the issue of exclusivity leads to the con-
clusion that Congress intended the statute to repeal all prior remedies.
This presumption in favor of exclusivity violates the Supreme Court's rule
against repeal by implication. The Court has stated that it would find repeal
only when Congress gives "some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal"
or if "the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable. 15 3 Under the Supreme
Court's view, congressional silence implies an intent to retain prior remedies.
Thus, Zombro's view is inconsistent with this line of Supreme Court prece-
dent. 154 Because Congress never stated explicitly that it intended to repeal sec-
tion 1983155 and because a section 1983 claim is not irreconcilable with the
ADEA, the Zombro court should have held that the ADEA and section 1983
are concurrent remedies for age discrimination.
The court's result was wrong, however, under either view because Congress
indicated that it intended to retain existing age discrimination remedies.15 6 The
court also made two mistakes in interpreting congressional intent: overlooking
the distinction between an ADEA-based and a Constitution-based age discrimi-
nation claim, and stating that a statute's comprehensiveness suffices as congres-
sional intent to repeal existing remedies. Determining congressional intent for
section 1983 is more difficult than for most statutes because section 1983 serves
as a remedy for numerous civil rights violations. 157 Accordingly, a section 1983
age-discrimination claim can be based on the ADEA or on some other existing
right, such as the equal protection clause. Many courts have recognized the
importance of this distinction in determining congressional intent to exclude
prior remedies.1 58 The Zombro court overlooked this valuable distinction in ex-
cluding both section 1983 actions based on the ADEA and section 1983 claims
based on an independent, constitutional right. The Zombro court conceded
Zombro's age discrimination claim based solely on the Constitution was "unu-
sual," 159 yet the court concluded that "[a] mere assertion that constitutional
rights have been somehow infringed does not ipsofacto defeat the coverage, ap-
plication and exclusivity of a comprehensive statutory scheme."' 16
152. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1367.
153. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974).
154. See, eg., id.; Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1012-13. The Court in Robinson viewed the legislative
history and the comprehensiveness of the statute as explicit congressional intent. The Court was not
willing to repeal the statute merely because Congress failed to state expressly that it intended to keep
prior remedies. It required a showing that "Congress intended the [legislation at issue] to be the
exclusive avenue." Id. at 1009. Under the Zombro view, plaintiffs will have more difficulty bringing
independent claims because the plaintiff will have to prove Congress intended to retain prior reme-
dies. Under the Supreme Court view, plaintiffs are more likely to sustain independent claims be-
cause they need only prove that Congress did not intend to repeal existing remedies.
155. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1374-75 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
156. See supra notes 67-68 and infra note 168.
157. The statute states: "Every person [who]... subjects... any citizen... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable [under
§ 1983]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added).
158. See supra notes 80-104 and accompanying text.
159. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1367.
160. Id. at 1368.
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Supreme Court precedent justified excluding the first type of section 1983
claim, one based on rights created by the ADEA.161 With this type of claim, the
ADEA's comprehensiveness is an appropriate guide to congressional intent.
The Supreme Court has noted that a section 1983 claim to enforce a statute
providing its own remedies can be limited if the" 'governing statute provides the
exclusive remedy for violations of its terms.' "162 Congress did not state explic-
itly in the ADEA or in its legislative history that it intended to repeal additional
remedies for ADEA violations. Yet the ADEA's comprehensive enforcement
scheme, conciliation goals, and limited remedies indirectly reflect Congress' in-
tent that the ADEA be the "exclusive remedy" for any ADEA claim. 163 A
plaintiff asserting an ADEA claim but trying to get the benefits of section 1983's
remedies or procedures should not be allowed to "bypass the specific administra-
tive process." 164 In addition, an ADEA-based section 1983 claim was not an
"existing" remedy for the aged at the time Congress enacted the ADEA because
the ADEA created this right. In fact, disallowing an ADEA-based section 1983
claim is not a repeal of a congressional act because Congress never intended to
create such a claim.
The Zombro court erred, however, in holding that the ADEA excludes sec-
tion 1983 claims based on the fourteenth amendment. In considering this type
of claim, the court should have looked at explicit congressional intent and not
just comprehensiveness before repealing prior remedies. The Zombro court
failed to follow the Supreme Court's view that when two "independent" claims
exist, "certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be en-
forced in their respective appropriate forums." 165 The Zombro court's holding
is inconsistent with ADEA cases ruling that a plaintiff can assert a section 1983
action if "[the] defendants violated some federally secured right other than those
already protected by the ADEA." 166 The Zombro court's view is also inconsis-
tent with non-ADEA Supreme Court authority stating that the "distinctly sepa-
rate nature of these ... rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated
as a result of the same factual occurrence."
167
The Zombro court overlooked the explicit congressional intent in the
ADEA's legislative history stating that Congress intended to retain constitu-
161. See Great Am. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 377 (1979) (holding
that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) cannot be used to assert Title VII claims).
162. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
163. McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
164. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1367.
165. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49-50
(1974)), The Zombro court's hesitation to find a distinction between ADEA claims may result from
the fact that equal protection claims may mirror ADEA claims so much that the two claims do not
seem "independent." For example, the Robinson court rejected the equal protection claims because
they were "virtually identical to [the] EHA claims" and "the equal protection claim added nothing
to petitioners' claims under the EHA." Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009, 1009 n.12 (1984),
superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (Supp. V 1987). The issue, however, is whether the
§ 1983 claim existed prior to the ADEA, not whether the ADEA and the § 1983 claims overlap.
166. See, eg., Morgan v. Humboldt County School Dist., 623 F. Supp. 440, 443 (D. Nev. 1985).
167. Great Am. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979) (quoting
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1974)).
1990] 1013
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tional claims under section 1983 after it created Title VII and the ADEA. 168
The Zombro court cited several Title VII cases as support for the ADEA's ex-
clusivity, but it did not refer to Title VII's legislative history implying that the
ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for constitutional age-discrimination
claims. 169 The Supreme Court and many other courts have extrapolated con-
gressional intent for the ADEA from the closely related Title VII.170 The Zom-
bro court, instead, mistakenly relied on the FLSA for support. No other court
addressing the ADEA's exclusivity has relied on the FLSA for guidance. 17 1 As
the district court in Christie v. Marston-a case the Zombro court cited to sup-
port the exclusivity of the ADEA-stated: "The FLSA is not particularly help-
ful in determining the effect of a statute upon prior constitutional claims,
because unlike the ADEA or Title VII, the FLSA did not create a statutory
right which arguably was already guaranteed by the Constitution."' 72 In addi-
tion, the district court case on which the Zombro court based its argument,
Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., did not address the exclusivity of the
FLSA over independent, non-FLSA rights, but instead held only that the FLSA
was exclusive to enforce "whatever rights [a plaintiff] may have under the
FLSA."1 73
Despite explicit congressional intent to retain remedies,1 74 the Zombro
court relied on the ADEA's comprehensiveness as an indication of congressional
intent. The court was correct that alternative remedies may be "inconsistent
with Congress' carefully tailored scheme." 175  Looking to indirect signs of in-
tent from a statute's comprehensiveness may be appropriate when a plaintiff
brings a Bivens claim or an ADEA-based section 1983 claim. Comprehensive-
ness, however, should not be sufficient to repeal an existing statutory remedy. 176
The Zombro court correctly noted several Supreme Court decisions show-
ing a "disinclination to entertain section 1983 actions in which plaintiffs have
168. Seesupra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. When it extended Title VII to state and local
employees, Congress intended Title VII to be "an alternative administrative remedy to the existing
prohibition against discrimination... embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1871." H.R. REP. No.
238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. Naws, 2137, 2154. Congress said
that "the individual's right to file a civil action in his own behalf, pursuant to... §§ 1981 and 1983,
is in no way affected." Id. Senator Lloyd Bentsen indicated during one hearing that a § 1983 action
for equal protection in an age discrimination suit would also be retained by stating that "those
principles underlying the provisions in the EEOC bill (extending Title VII to state and local employ-
ees) are directly applicable to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act." 118 CONG. REC. 15,895
(1972).
169. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1368-69.
170. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1979). See supra note 67 and accompa-
nying text.
171. See supra notes 67, 85-90 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court did use the FLSA to
interpret the right to a jury trial under the ADEA. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
172. Christie v. Marston, 451 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see also Kelly v.
Wauconda, 801 F.2d 269, 271 n.4 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The connection of the ADEA amendment to the
legislation enacting FLSA amendments was largely fortuitous.") (quoting EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d
601, 610 (7th Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987).
173. Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
174. See supra note 168.
175. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1013 (1984), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)
(Supp. 1987).
176. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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bypassed a comprehensive statutory remedy in favor of a section 1983 claim." 17 7
The Zombro court's decision will encourage this judicial trend toward indirectly
finding congressional intent to eliminate alternative remedies. This trend has
surfaced not because Congress truly intended comprehensive statutes to become
exclusive remedies, but because courts have been more willing to find congres-
sional intent where they would not have before. This trend is unfortunate, how-
ever, because it allows courts to repeal a statute whenever a comprehensive
statute is enacted later. Courts can replace their judgment for Congress' by as-
suming that Congress never intends to retain other remedies after enacting a
comprehensive statute. This assumption will often be contrary to congressional
intent, as it was for the Education for the Handicapped Act. After the Supreme
Court in Smith v. Robinson 178 ruled that Congress intended for this comprehen-
sive statute to be exclusive, Congress amended the statute to permit additional
remedies. 179 In addition, this trend is incongruent with other Supreme Court
cases indicating the "Supreme Court's strong policy against repeal of legislation
by implication." '1 80 Both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have been
hesitant to repeal civil rights statutes l8 1 despite a later statute's "design for a
comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in
employment." 182
Comprehensiveness especially should not be controlling when explicit con-
gressional intent exists. As one commentator stated, congressional intent should
be implied from comprehensiveness only when "there was no explicit legislative
history indicating congressional intent to leave existing remedies unaffected." 1
83
Only then should courts "turn to secondary, less direct signs of congressional
intent."'18 4 In particular, the Zombro court should not have examined compre-
hensiveness because Congress explicitly stated that prior remedies should not be
foreclosed by the ADEA and Title VII.
In addition to congressional intent, the court found a second reason for
finding the ADEA exclusive in this case: "additional factors exist counselling
177. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1368 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); and Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Org. 441 U.S. 600, 673 (1979)). In these cases, however, the Supreme Court
cited other signs of explicit congressional intent to repeal remedies before finding prior remedies
exclusive. In addition, these cases involved Bivens claims and habeas corpus statutes, neither of
which is governed by the same test as an existing statutory remedy. See supra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text (discussing the various tests).
178. 468 U.S. 992 (1984), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (Supp. 1987).
179. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (Supp. 1987).
180. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1373. Compare Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) ("When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are
sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the rem-
edy of suit under § 1983.") with Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) ("[I]t is the duty of
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as
effective.").
181. Keller v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 957 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[Ain implied repeal
ignores the nature of the social malady" that civil rights statutes were intended to eradicate.).
182. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
183. Shapiro, supra note 76, at 117.
184. Id.; see Storey v. Board of Regents, 600 F. Supp. 838, 840 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
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hesitation."' 1 5 These factors included Maryland's and Baltimore's "well-estab-
lished public policy" that government employers must have "wide discretion
and control over the management of their personnel and internal operations." 1 86
The additional-factors test is not the appropriate standard for determining the
exclusivity of a congressionally created right and the Zombro court should not
have even considered such factors. Other Supreme Court decisions have not
considered such factors in determining a statute's exclusivity. 187 The Supreme
Court articulated this two-prong test of examining (1) congressional intent and
(2) "special factors" that counsel hesitation in deciding whether to permit Bivens
implied constitutional claims.188 Because Zombro did not involve a Bivens
claim, this Bivens test should not have been used. Even if the Bivens standard is
helpful in deciding exclusivity, the threshold for allowing a judicially created
Bivens claim should be much lower than the threshold for finding exclusivity of
an existing statutory remedy. The Zombro court mistakenly applied a standard
for rejecting a judicially created remedy to a case involving two congressionally
created remedies.
If the Zombro court should have considered the two additional factors it
cited-deference to public employers and paramilitary employers-it should
have examined these factors only in applying the rational-basis test for equal
protection claims. If the city proposed a rational reason for wanting younger
police officers, then the court could defer to the city because of the policy grant-
ing public employers and police departments "wide discretion and control over
the management of [their] personnel and internal affairs." 189 Congress clearly
did not intend for state and local governments and police departments to be
immune from the coisequences of age-based discrimination since both are sub-
ject to the ADEA's requirements. 190 In addition, the Supreme Court illustrated
in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia 191 and Vance v. Bradley 192 that
185. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369.
186. Id.
187. See, eg., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f) (Supp. 1987); Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1984); Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425
U.S. 820 (1976).
188. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
189. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974). The Zombro court cited several cases dis-
missing age discrimination claims because of the deference shown federal employers. However, state
and local employers, such as the city of Baltimore, are not given as much discretion as federal
employers. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, the "federal government and its employees is a 'special
factor counseling hesitation' in inferring a direct cause of action" because of the "extensive grievance
procedures normally available to a federal employee." Ray v. Nimmo, 704 F.2d 1480, 1486 (11 th
Cir. 1983). This federal/nonfederal distinction is especially appropriate when the ADEA is involved
because the ADEA covers federal employees with a specific section, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1982 & Supp.
1987), that provides separate procedures. In contrast, state and local employees, such as Zombro,
are covered as any other private employer by the inclusion of any "state or political subdivision of a
state" in the definition of "employer." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982). The ADEA's 1986 amendments permit mandatory retirement
of firefighters and law enforcement officers who attain hiring or retiring age under state or local law
as long as it is "pursuant to a bona fide hiring or retirement plan that is not a subterfuge to evade
purposes of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 623(i) (Supp. V 1987).
191. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
192. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
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an equal protection claim could be lodged despite an employee's occupation as a
police officer or foreign service agent.193
The Zombro court's alternative holding indicated that age-based equal pro-
tection claims are not justiciable, except as challenges to mandatory retirement
statutes. 194 This holding rendered the entire exclusivity discussion moot. The
court essentially said that although it just decided that the ADEA preempted
Zombro's equal protection claim, Zombro never had an equal protection claim
in the first place.
The court's view of the aged's equal protection rights is not supported by
the law. 195 Clearly, as the Zombro court stated, Supreme Court precedent does
not consider the aged a "suspect class" in need of "special protection" and
"strict judicial scrutiny." 196 However, the Zombro court misstated the law
when it held that equal protection is available only to those discriminated
against on the basis of "impermissible race or sex discrimination or First
Amendment violations." 197 The aged receive equal protection rights under the
"relatively relaxed" rationality standard, which examines whether a classifica-
tion is "rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest. ' 198 The
Fourth Circuit acknowledged this standard and applied it in Arritt v. Grisell,199
holding that "rationality is the proper standard by which to determine whether
the instant age classification violates equal protection. ' '2°° The Zombro court's
193. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
194. The holding creates confusion by stating that the decision applies only to an "aged-based
disparate treatment challenge to a particular personnel decision," but not to "a Murgia-type chal-
lenge to mandatory retirement statutes." Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1370 n.4. Murgia, however, did not
suggest that the rationality standard should apply only to challenges to mandatory retirement laws.
Murgia merely held that state action against the aged would be prohibited if it was not rationally
related to a legitimate interest. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314-16.
195. See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
196. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
197. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1370-71. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d
634 (4th Cir. 1979), which the Zombro court cited for the proposition that only race, sex, and first
amendment rights receive equal protection, is not helpful in evaluating Zombro's equal protection
claim. The Clark court declined to recognize an equal protection claim because a faculty member
merely questioned a "neutral" personnel decision. The result would be different, according to the
court, if the decision were discriminatory and "motivated by a desire to curtail or to penalize the
exercise of an employee's constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 639. As the Zombro dissent
pointed out, Clark's references to race, sex, and first amendment discrimination were merely exam-
ples of potential equal protection claims. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1378 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
This is clear from a footnote in Clark that added that "if the rule on its face discriminated against
out-of-staters or non-graduates, a justiciable equal protection claim might be presented." Clark, 607
F.2d at 641 n.13. Furthermore, other courts have not limited equal protection claims to race, sex,
and first amendment discrimination. Courts have reviewed equal protection claims for discrimina-
tory economic regulations, such as state Sunday closing laws, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1960), and regulations of vehicle advertisements, Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949). They also have examined equal protection claims for discrimination against other non-
suspect classes, including the mentally retarded, illegitimate children, and the poor. See, eg., Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (legitimacy as a prerequisite to receiving worker's
compensation); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (effect of wealth on right to
vote).
198. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312.
199. 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court originally applied this standard in
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312, and Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). See supra notes 111-17 and
accompanying text.
200. Arritt, 567 F.2d at 1272.
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language contradicted the Arritt holding and implied that the aged have no equal
protection rights whatsoever. The court stated: "We find Zombro's claim as
asserted under the Fourteenth Amendment, based upon alleged discriminatory
transfer, is not justiciable. There is no claim of denial of equal protection based
upon race or sex or discrimination based upon the exercise of protected First
Amendment rights. '201 The court may have meant that the Baltimore police
department's decision to transfer Zombro passed the rational relation test. The
language it chose, however, confused its holding and created the unfortunate
possibility that lower courts will proceed on the assumption that the aged have
no equal protection rights.
The Zombro decision affects not just older police officers shuffled out of the
public eye, but also all state and local government employers and employees, as
well as all older citizens. Zombro will have some desirable consequences. The
decision will make the ADEA more effective by requiring a worker to "use the
statutorily prescribed remedial framework that was set up for his benefit."'202 It
could help facilitate the ADEA's goal of helping "employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems" by requiring plaintiffs to wait to file suit until the
EEOC has an opportunity to conciliate. By streamlining all claims under the
ADEA, employers and their attorneys will become more familiar with its statu-
tory requirements and learn to follow its procedures more closely as preventative
measures. In addition, courts that follow Zombro now will have a bright-line
rule: The ADEA is the sole remedy for all age discrimination claims. Courts
will not have to examine whether the section 1983 suit is based on the ADEA or
some other existing right, but merely can deny any age discrimination suit not
brought under the ADEA.
On the other hand, Zombro will cause many wrongfully demoted, retired or
fired plaintiffs to go without any remedy. This will happen because age discrimi-
nation may give rise to an equal protection claim, but not an ADEA claim. For
example, under a statute like the one in Arritt v. Grisell203 requiring that appli-
cants for original appointment to the police force be between the ages of eighteen
and thirty-five, a thirty-nine-year-old-plaintiff would be unable to bring an
ADEA claim because of the ADEA's age-forty minimum, yet he would have no
other remedy. Also, plaintiffs such as Officer Zombro who do not precisely meet
the ADEA's stringent filing and procedural requirements would be without any
remedy for age discrimination. In addition, victims of age discrimination may
require compensatory or punitive damages, yet they could receive only the lim-
ited remedies available under the ADEA. As the Supreme Court noted in John-
son v. Railway Express Agency, 2z 4 allowing alternative remedies may "tend to
deter efforts at conciliation" and "weaken the Commission's efforts to induce
voluntary compliance. '2 05 Yet the Court accepted these drawbacks because
201. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1371.
202. Brief to Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Opposition at 6, Zombro (No. 86-2659).
203. 567 F.2d at 1269.
204. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
205. Id. at 461.
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"these are the natural effects of the choice Congress has made available to the
claimant by its conferring upon him independent administrative and judicial
remedies."'20 6 As the Fourth Circuit itself has held, "the problem of employ-
ment discrimination reveals that a battery of remedies is required to combat
entrenched discrimination. '207
The Zombro court expressed fear that the ADEA would be "undermined, if
not destroyed" 208 by alternative remedies. Congress, however, took a much
greater risk in allowing both section 1983 and Title VII claims for race and sex
discrimination because these classifications receive heightened scrutiny and will
generate many more recoveries under parallel section 1983 claims. Therefore,
Congress would not hesitate to allow the "smaller risk that age discrimination
plaintiffs might forego the ADEA remedies in favor of a constitutional challenge
under section 1983."209 Nonsuspect classifications, such as the aged, will win
equal protection suits only when "the varying treatment of different groups or
persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate pur-
poses."210 This fact minimizes the risk that all state and local employees will
seek refuge in federal court. As the Zombro dissent noted, plaintiffs "simply
have a much better chance of winning if they sue under the ADEA. '211
Although the aged could have difficulty winning equal protection claims,
success is not impossible. Officer Zombro's case does not present the most op-
pressive form of age discrimination conceivable because he was not fired and he
did not lose any wages. Even though Officer Zombro may not be able to prevail
under the equal protection clause on the facts of his case, fact scenarios do exist
in which a state or local government act was not "rationally related to furthering
a legitimate state interest."'212 For example, if a state or local employee over age
forty is fired solely on the basis of age and age is not a bona fide occupational
qualification, that act could not be justified as being rationally related to any
legitimate state interest. The aged "should be given the chance to try"2 13 to win
on a legitimate equal protection claim.
Zombro's holding could also result in future decisions finding other statutes
exclusive when found to be comprehensive or whenever "special factors" coun-
sel hesitation. This could happen despite the Supreme Court's rule against re-
peal by implication and despite congressional intent to retain independent rights.
When the Zombro court found exclusivity in the ADEA's comprehensiveness, it
replaced Congress' intent with its own.
Congress could address the Zombro court's decision in three possible ways.
First, Congress could amend the ADEA to specify which additional remedies,
such as section 1983, are available to workers. Second, if Congress really fears
206. Id.
207. Keller v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 957 (4th Cir. 1987).
208. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1367.
209. Id. at 1376 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
210. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
211. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1376 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
212. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam).
213. Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1379 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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that section 1983 claims undermine the ADEA, it could make the ADEA exclu-
sive but amend the ADEA to make it more favorable for age-discrimination
victims. These improvements might include adding more remedies such as com-
pensatory and punitive damages, and lessening the stringent procedures, such as
the time limits for filing and the qualifications for coverage. Finally, Congress
could require plaintiffs to use the ADEA's conciliation process before bringing
civil suits based on constitutional rights. These changes would improve the
ADEA's efficiency without hindering age-discrimination victims. However,
Congress' hands often are tied by employers' lobbies that oppose Title VII and
the ADEA. Therefore, to ensure that older workers are not left without a rem-
edy, the Supreme Court must review a case such as Zombro and decide that
Congress did not intend the ADEA to be exclusive.
Zombro is significant because of the "dearth of cases that address the issue
whether the A.D.E.A. is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination. '214 Zom-
bro is the first appellate decision stating that the ADEA excludes a constitu-
tional cause of action for age discrimination against a nonfederal employee.215
Yet Zombro failed to recognize that Congress-not the courts-must decide if a
new statute repeals an existing, independent claim. In addition, the Zombro
court's alternative holding may cause other courts to dismiss older Americans'
equal protection claims on their face without balancing the reasonableness of the
employer's action against legitimate state interests. Congress intended the
ADEA to be "a clear cut and implemented Federal policy [that] would provide
a foundation for a much-needed vigorous, nationwide campaign to promote hir-
ing without discrimination on the basis of age." 216 Instead, under the Zombro
court's view, the existence of the ADEA actually will hinder that nationwide
campaign aimed at quashing discrimination against older Americans.
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